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In this paper, we propose an analytical framework suggesting that wage nonpayment in
the Russian state sector and privatized factories, which resulted from acute cash flow problems
in both, reflected an implicit contract among the government, managers and labor against worker
layoff.
We analyze the impact of wage nonpayment on workers grouped by demographic
features, occupation and job location on the basis of a panel data set covering the years 1994 to
1996. Based on a multivariate specification that incorporates these features, we find that the
frequency and amount of wage withholding increased sharply in 1996. While wages were denied
less frequently and in lower amounts to low paid workers by age, occupation and location, this
pattern (for which we find a correlation between the frequency of wage nonpayment and wage
level at the regional level), needs to be confirmed with further statistical tests.
While the practice of wage nonpayment tended to push families into poverty and increase
their expectation of living in poverty in the immediate future, it also raised the likelihood of
workers holding additional jobs and undertaking informal paid activity. At the same time, the
frequency and magnitude of barter payments to workers in our sample were not sufficient to
exercise a significant effect in mitigating the adverse effects of wage arrears.
The Wage Arrears Crisis in Russia
Introduction
The failure of Russian institutions to fully pay their employees had become a crisis by
1996 creating serious difficulties for the continuing prospects of Russia's market economy
reforms.1 According to official estimates, outstanding wage arrears increased substantially
throughout 1996, rising from 22,114 billion rubles at the end of the first quarter (constituting 71
percent of the monthly wage bill) to 38,712 billion rubles at the end of the fourth quarter (at 114
percent of the monthly wage bill).2 Averaged over employees who were actually owed wages,
the stock of outstanding unpaid wages amounted to approximately 275 percent of one month's
wages (RET, 1991 A, p.71).
How does the situation in 1996 compare to the earlier years of the transition?
Comparison of total wage arrears in 1996 to earlier years is problematic because sectors for
which wage arrears are reported are not comparable: only medium and large-sized enterprises in
industry, construction, and agriculture reported data on wage arrears from 1992-94; the
transportation sector was added in 1995; in 1996, four noncommercial sectors were added ~
health care, education, culture, and science. We can however assess changes since 1992 by
looking at the three continually covered sectors. In the table below, the constant dollar value of
'institutional failure to pay employees is but one component of a wider nonpayment crisis that
includes tax and inter-enterprise arrears. Clearly, the various elements of the Russian nonpayments crisis
are interrelated, i.e inter-enterprise arrears contribute to enterprises failing to fully pay their workers on
time due to the resulting liquidity constraints; tax arrears similarly lead to wage arrears indirectly as the
government fails to fully pay suppliers on time, and directly as it fails to pay employees in the "budget
sector" (sectors directly funded by local and federal government budgets). In this study, we do not analyze
the impact of these factors on the wage arrears problem, though some of the regional and occupational
patterns that we later present can be interpreted in light of the broader nonpayment crisis.
2These figures are based on eight sectors (namely, industry, agriculture, construction,
transportation, education, culture, health care, and science) for which wage arrears have been reported
beginning in 1996, and which constitute approximately 78 percent of total official employment in 1995.
They exclude wage arrears in the financial sector, trade, and public administration, which are evidently
negligible (see Russian Economic Trends, hereafter RET, vol.5(3)), and do not cover the large military
sector in which wage arrears are believed to be quite substantial. Again, data on wage arrears in the

















outstanding wage arrears increased between 1992 and 1996 by approximately 17-fold in industry,
10-fold in construction, and 12-fold in agriculture. As percentage of the sector's monthly wage
bill, the increase was approximately 22-fold in industry,
Trends in Sectoral Wages Arrears







(2) Ratio of outstanding wage arrears to the monthly wage bill (percent)
1992 5 6 6
1993 13 10 36
1994 31 23 68
1995 61 40 102
1996 111 74 158
SOURCE: RET, 1997.1
12-fold in construction, and 26-fold in agriculture. Thus, the problem of wage arrears, which
have been continually rising over the course of the transition, became acute in 1996. As a result,
strikes, which were remarkably low during the early years of the transition, rose significantly in
1996 ~ the number of working days lost to strikes in December 1996 exceeded the total number
of days lost in 1995. Again, these strikes were concentrated mainly in coal mining and
education, two sectors that have experienced high levels of wage arrears.3
Despite the mounting wage arrears and the widely recognized and publicly
articulated concern over the issue,4 evidence relating to the demographic aspects of the problem
and an in-depth study of the distribution of wage arrears among Russian workers by demographic
features, occupation, and job location have been missing. In this paper, we employ a unique
household database of the Russian population to fill this gap and address several issues. In
Section I, we define the analytical framework underpinning the emergence and escalation of
wage nonpayment from the budget and by enterprises. We argue that government decision
makers and enterprise managers facing cash flow problems and reluctant to fire workers,
resorted to enforcing lower wages among employees by denying them wages rather than
removing them from the payroll. Second, based on traditional employment policies, labor
market practices, and emerging job possibilities in Russia, we suggest several hypotheses in
Section II about our expectations relating to the relative severity of wage nonpayment by gender,
age and education, by occupation , and by job location. Third, we provide evidence in Section III
on the level, trend, and occurrence of wage arrears by demographic, occupation, and job location
variables, one at a time, during the period 1994-1996. In Section IV, we extend our univariate
analysis of wage arrears to a multivariate specification involving the demographic, occupation
and job location variables. In Section V, we provide evidence suggesting that the pattern of wage
nonpayment in Russia's regions was influenced more by fairness to the low-paid workers
evidently by managers withholding relatively less payment from them than by considerations of
retaining (the relatively more discriminated) high-paid workers on the payroll in the interest of
productivity gain, we analyze the impact of wage arrears on the respondents' viewing of their
future well-being and their likelihood of being in poverty in Section VI.5 We then investigate
3Miners had also previously gone on strike to protest wage arrears in February 1995.
4The government's failure to fully pay its employees is a fraction of the payments problem. In
June 1997, wage arrears in the eight sectors of the economy (mentioned earlier) amounted to 53.9 trillion
rubles of which 11 trillion rubles (20.4 percent of the total) were due to nonpayment from local and
federal budgets. Wage arrears to the military were estimated separately at 5.4 trillion rubles.
5Wage nonpayment not only reduces family disposable income directly but also cuts into family
wealth because wage arrears are not indexed. This means that even if Russian workers were to be
barter arrangements between enterprises and workers in Section VII with a view to judging the
emergence of barter practices in response to wage arrears. In Section VIII, we assess the impact
of wage arrears on the likelihood that people will either hold multiple jobs or additionally engage
in less formal, paid economic activity. We summarize our findings in the concluding Section IX.
I. The Analytical Framework: Why Mounting Wage Arrears?
Workers were denied wages, and increasingly so from 1994-1996 (the years covered
here) because the government and enterprises faced mounting cash flow problems.
The federal treasury's ability to collect taxes had weakened over time: in 1996, the tax
collection amounted to 60 percent of projected revenues forcing the government to trim outlays
and stay within the budget deficit targets. Even as tax collection was lagging, the budgeted
allocations earmarked for payments to employees were diverted to other uses by local
governments and military generals.
Among the tax delinquents on the list of the federal treasury were large enterprises,
especially in the energy sector, whose lagging tax payments strained the government's ability to
pay its suppliers of energy and military items, in turn causing them to withhold wages from their
employees.
Not only were the financial links between the government and enterprises impaired as the
transition proceeded, but inter-enterprise connections deteriorated affecting their financial
viability. Among the most affected were military factories and energy suppliers. The former
faced varying, drastic cutbacks in state orders, and the latter continued supplying energy to
households at subsidized rates without being fully compensated from the budget. At the same
time, industrial enterprises built up a massive debt to the energy sector.
Could the government and enterprises have acquired cash by borrowing from the banks
and the public? The budget-deficit targets specified by the International Monetary Fund and
approved by the Duma increasingly lowered and ultimately (by mid-1997) ruled out government
borrowing from the central bank. As interest payments from the federal budget escalated,
eventually repaid, they would have suffered a significant loss given the high monthly inflation rates that
persisted to the end of 1996.
government borrowing from the public and the commercial banks was also restricted. By mid-
1997, the government was left with tax revenues and receipts from sales of government stock in
privatized companies as the sole financing sources.
Enterprises were reluctant to borrow from banks at prohibitive interest rates in order to
pay workers. The rediscount rate set by the central bank was brought down from over 200
percent in 1992 to about 35 to 40 percent in 1996, the latter rate beginning to reflect the cost of
borrowing in the market. The annualized rate of interest on government short-term treasury bills
toward the end of 1996 was around 25 to 30 percent. With annual inflation running close to 20
percent at the time, government borrowing tended to soak funds from the banks. Enterprises and
local governments also invested available cash in treasury bonds to earn positive real interest
income rather than use it for paying employees.
Serious though the cash-flow problems were for the government and the enterprises, these
were necessary but not sufficient grounds for them to resort to withholding wage payments and
enforcing effective downward wage flexibility on the workforce. The alternative of releasing
workers from the payroll was not acted upon energetically.
Bound by the Soviet-era tradition of nominal full employment, workers and managers
were unwilling to opt for the market economy solution of rapid layoffs. Managers, constrained
by the "workers are my family" syndrome put workers on reduced pay and forced vacations
without pay rather than render them jobless. With such paternalism in swing, managers could
siphon off factory funds for personal gain or lucrative investments rather than wage payment.
Workers, accustomed to receiving an array of benefits, including school, hospital, and day-care
services, as well as low-cost housing, all attached to the factory, settled for receiving these
entitlements with reduced pay in preference to losing their jobs and the associated benefits.
Managers and workers thus opted for informal arrangements involving implicit payoffs for both
sides rather than explicit contract renegotiations which characterize market economies. The
symbiotic, negotiating stance persisted in the post-privatization period because most factories
selected the privatization option which allowed 51 percent stock ownership to managers and
workers.
The government let these arrangements balloon into a full-blown crisis by failing to
revise the tax code in time, collect taxes under the prevailing tax provisions, and enforce
bankruptcies in the least viable factories. Its Bankruptcy Resolution of 20 May 1994 laid down
the procedures for converting privatized factories into economically viable units. The resolution
ruled out further state subsidies while granting enterprises an 18-month moratorium on repaying
debts, during which time enterprise managers were to sell off assets and find new investors. In
practice, the bankruptcy resolution was applied to prevent massive enterprise liquidations and
worker layoffs. With 40 to 70 percent of the plants in some regions economically unviable,
managers needed incentives to redesign rather than close them. In market economies, bankruptcy
procedures are carried out by independent participants such as arbiters, bankruptcy court judges,
and accountants. By contrast, the Russian approach was embodied in a bureaucratic pyramid: the
Federal Bankruptcy Agency, functioning since September 1993, influenced and monitored the
decisions of the local bankruptcy agencies covering 82 regions. Till the end of 1995, former First
Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets personally oversaw the restructuring of large units in the
defense, heavy industrial, and energy-producing sectors of the economy. Despite the presence of
private auditors, decisions regarding the fate of most factories were hardly the work of
independent experts applying objective economic criteria.
By early August 1994, a hundred factories were on the auditors' insolvency list, with
several dozen being added each day. But insolvency did not imply liquidation, for there was in
place a top-down, bureaucratized industrial policy calculated to facilitate factory conversion.
Russian industry top-heavy with huge and unwieldy units, hobbled by slow-moving management,
and watched by a government legitimately concerned with the social consequences of enterprise
failures or reoganizations, was thus geared for sluggish but pell-mell change at the start of 1996.
1996, however, was the nadir of faltering state authority in Russia's fledgling market
economy marked by the collapse of contractual obligations and their enforcement. The
government, having failed to boost tax collection despite the setting of the Temporary
Emergency Commission, resorted to more wage sequestration. Enterprises withheld tax and
wage payments. Local governments diverted federal funds earmarked for employee
remuneration. Army generals used budgetary allocations meant for soldiers' pay for weapons
procurement and maintenance of military bases. Preparations for the Presidential elections of
June 1996 and President Yeltsin's prolonged recuperation to normal health after his reelection
ruled out new initiatives for breaking the expedient web of arrangements, involving wage
nonpayment, among the government, enterprises and labor. The Soviet-era social contract of
"they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work for them" had been revived by cash-strapped
employers violating wage contracts with a permissive workforce as state authority weakened.
The new, reformist government appointed in March 1997 faced public outcry over wage
nonpayment and the IMF mandate (incorporated in the budget deficit target) of an early
liquidation of government debts. By June 1997, the government had paid off pension arrears
with a World Bank credit earmarked for the purpose. President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree in
July ordering the government to clear outstanding payments to state workers by the end of the
year, with wage debts to the military to be paid by October. The President also suggested to
Gennadii Seleznev, Chairman of the State Duma (lower house of the Russian parliament) that the
Russian Criminal Code be supplemented with a clause stipulating that state officials and
enterprise managers, who failed to pay wages or pension contributions, be deprived of the right
to occupy certain posts or imprisoned for a period of between one and ten years.
Over the long haul, the solution of the payments problem will require fundamental
changes in the Russian economy. In the short-run, a significant portion of government arrears
will undoubtedly be cleared via settlement of tax arrears by large natural monopolies such as
Gazprom, revenues from successive rounds of sale of government stocks in privatized
companies and credits from international agencies. These arrears can be brought under control if
current attempts to adopt a realistic federal budget, to reform the tax code and collect taxes, and
effectively supervise the disbursement of funds allocated to local governments are implemented.
Enterprise-based wage arrears, approximately 80 percent of the total, present a formidable
problem defying an early resolution. In the short run, some of these debts can be discounted at
various rates requiring judgment calls with regard to the enterprises involved. This is a less
costly option for the workers than eventually having the debts completely written off. In the long
run, wage nonpayment will decline if enterprise restructuring aimed at releasing excess labor
moves forward6, and bankruptcy laws are enforced leading to closure of unviable enterprises.
On current indications, wage nonpayment to workers will have peaked in 1996
brought on by cash flow problems in the government sector and privatized enterprises,
accentuated by the traditional reluctance of managers to layoff workers, and facilitated by the
widespread weakening of contractual obligations and their enforcement by state organs. Before
stating suitable criteria for assessing the impact of wage arrears by demographic features,
occupation, and job location of households, we define our expectations of this pattern by
presenting a number of hypotheses based on Russian employment and labor market practices
and the effects of transition policies on different regions and occupations.
II. Expected Pattern of Wage Arrears by Demographic Features, Occupation, and Job Location of
Of Households: Some Hypotheses
We adopt three measures for assessing wage nonpayment. These are the fraction of
household respondents who were denied wages (hereafter the frequency or occurrence of
nonpayment), the average cumulated ruble value of wages withheld at the time of interview
(hereafter the amount or magnitude of nonpayment), and finally, the cumulated value divided by
average monthly wage (hereafter the relative amount or the ratio of nonpayment). These three
criteria are discussed later.
A caveat is in order in formulating the hypotheses about the expected patterns of wage
nonpayment. Respondents in a given age group were likely to be denied wages more frequently
and in larger amounts than those in another group. However, the relative amounts or ratios of
nonpayment might not work out to be unfavorable for the former because these depend
additionally on the monthly wage. Therefore, we suggest our hypotheses with regard to the
simpler and easily tractable measures of the frequency and amount of wage nonpayment.
Given these two criteria, how might one expect wage nonpayment to vary by the
demographic features of gender, age and education, by occupation, and job location?
6See Aukutsionek and Kapeliushnikov (1996) for a discussion of the incentives that prompt
Russian enterprise managers to retain rather than layoff redundant workers. Also see Desai and Idson,
1997.
As already noted, the choices facing state sector employers and enterprise managers were
to retain a worker with full wage and benefits, or remove him from the job, or deny him payment
for some time while keeping him on the job. Given the cash flow problem, it was difficult for an
employer to keep him on the job at the old wage. At the same time, managerial predisposition in
favor of keeping workers on the job, workers' readiness to accept temporary wage loss in return
for the entitlements by being officially on the payroll, and government hesitation against
implementing bankruptcy laws slowed the pace of involuntary job loss. The feasible option was
to slow employee layoff and enforce a flexible wage by withholding payment.
State sector decision makers and enterprise managers were therefore likely to devise
strategies of wage nonpayment which best helped them lower wage outlays and maintain or
increase sales revenues. The managers of financially stressed companies, unlike those in charge
of a few viable units, would focus on the short term problem of juggling their finances rather
than on the long term goal of trimming the workforce with a view to promoting enterprise
productivity and profitability. The two-track strategy of trimming wage outlays and managing
financial inflows implied that managers who chose to withhold wages of the better paid, more
productive workers ran the risk of affecting their productivity through the nonpayment
disincentive or their loss to another job. Given the high labor turnover in Russian factories,
employees with marketable skills and opportunities could be expected to move to a better job in
the enterprise or leave it altogether.7 Holding back wages of the better paid workers in the
interest of containing the wage bill could therefore backfire.
Which of the two tendencies—holding on to the better paid, more productive workers in
the interest of maintaining revenue inflows or retaining and paying the less paid workers with a
view to managing the wage bill—operated in the decision making calculations of Russian factory
managers? Such trade-offs were unlikely to prevail in the wage nonpayment practices of the
state sector in which wages could be expected to be withheld in a pro rata or ad hoc fashion
7For a discussion of job turnover in Russian enterprises, see Gimpelson (1996) and Desai and
Idson (1997). In the Russian context, job turnover usually implies moving to a different job within the
enterprise (without abrogating the wage contract) rather than quitting the job altogether and moving to a
different enterprise or location. The intra-enterprise job turnover has been high in Russia from the Soviet
days.
when revenue shortfalls appeared. We expect managers of cash-strapped factories to be
motivated as much by fairness as by productivity orientation especially if they are holdovers from
Soviet days and have risen to the top from the factory floor. A systematic wage denial to the less
educated, less skilled, low paid workers—most of them young entrants, women, and workers on
the brink of retirement— would, in our view, be unlikely. Better paid workers could experience
wage nonpayments often and in large amounts as managers steered between the Scylla of wage
bill trimming and the Charybdis of revenue enhancement.
Based on this analytical framework, we provide a few hypotheses of wage nonpayment by
demographic features, occupation and job location.
Wage Nonpayment Hypotheses with regard to Demographic Features
We begin with the potential impact of employer decision making on nonpayment to
women. Russian women have combined household chores with job responsibilities and have
failed to upgrade their skills through training. They are therefore concentrated in low paid jobs.
Being a relatively less heavy burden on the wage bill, they were likely to experience wage
nonpayment less frequently and in lower amounts for the years under consideration. On the other
hand, they might be regarded as supplementary, household wage earners by managers. Having
failed to improve their clout through factory networking for lack of time and motivation, they
could be subjected to more frequent wage withholding and over a longer time than a comparable
male employee.8 In that case, they could experience wage nonpayment more frequently and in
larger amounts than men.
We turn next to the possible relationship between age and the frequency and amount of
wage arrears. The youngest workers-17 to 25 years of age, new entrants in the workforce with
less skill and shorter work experience and concentrated in the lowest wage scale— were likely to
be subjected to less frequent and smaller wage withholdings than employees in the subsequent
age groups with more experience, better skill and higher pay. (Mean, per person monthly wages
by select demographic characteristics are reported in Table 7.1.) The frequency and amounts
8For a discussion of Russian employment patterns, wage policies, and worker training
opportunities across gender, age and occupation, see Desai and Idson (1997).
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withheld could peak for the most skilled workers with highest pay scales between the ages of 36
and 45 years.9 Beyond this age, with declining pay scales , wage nonpayment could be less
frequent and in lower amounts. It is however difficult to predict the cutoff point at which the
switch could take place.
What might one expect of the connection between education and wage nonpayment? Two
factors are relevant here. First, in Russia as in some industrial countries, the most educated,
among them scientists and researchers, earn less than skilled machine operators and engineers
in factories. Their retention on the factory payroll has relatively less impact on the wage bill.
Therefore, the wages of the former subset at the apex of the education hierarchy may be withheld
less frequently and in lower amounts than those of the latter who precede them in the educational
hierarchy. Paradoxically, the most educated factory employees~for example, research workers
and architects in the design department—could experience wage nonpayment with similar
frequency and amount as the less educated employees, close to the bottom of the education
hierarchy who also earn less. Second, the most educated personnel in former, government-
financed institutions and in nuclear power plants could experience more frequent and larger wage
nonpayments than the less educated because of the worsening finances in these places.
Wage Nonpayment Hypotheses with regard to Job Location
Wage withholding will vary depending on a region's general economic viability, the
commitment of the local administrations to continue paying wages to state employees from
federally transferred funds, the prevalence in a region of defense and heavy industries located in
company towns, and above all, the domination in the region of the natural resource sector with
high wages. (Mean, per person monthly wages by region are reported in Table 7.2.)
Moscow, a bustling financial center with construction and restructuring boom differs
sharply from other regions. Problems of converting military plants in Western Siberian company
towns, among them Armaz and Krasnoyarsk, have aggravated the economic plight of their
highly paid technicians with few alternative job opportunities. Again, workers in Moscow and
the resource-rich regions in the Northern Territories, the Far East, West and East Siberia, have on
9We are grateful to Vladimir Gimpelson for suggesting this hypothesis to us.
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average higher wages than in Central and Central-Black Earth regions, Volga-Vyatski and Volga
Basin, and Northern Caucasus. Employees in the former group could be subjected to more
frequent and higher wage nonpayments than in the latter. The wage arrears problem in the
Premorye region of the Far East was worsened by a prolonged power struggle between the
regional governor, Nazdratenko and the Federal Government which accused the governor of
misusing federal funds.
It is difficult for us to link the impact of these specific regional factors on wage
nonpayment. The eight regions adopted here are vast and we have not been able to connect the
sampled households to a smaller location such as a (defense industry) town enabling us to
formulate precise hypotheses and leaving us, at best, with broad judgments about the regional
variations in wage nonpayment.
Nonpayment Hypotheses with regard to Occupation
We expect occupational wage nonpayment likelihood to be determined by the ranking of
the occupations in the wage hierarchy. For example, the least paid groups, among them
unskilled workers and clerks were less likely to be subjected to wage nonpayment than
technicians and professionals, somewhat better paid, followed by the next groups with higher
wages, among them workers in crafts and related trades, and plant and machine operators. At
the same time, legislators, senior managers and officials could be expected to suffer less impact
of wage nonpayment despite high salaries because of their political and managerial clout. On
the other hand, army officers with high pays in our sample could be expected to incur the
heaviest wage nonpayment in view of the drastic cutback in military allocations from the budget
and the diversion of the funds by army generals, mentioned above, for weapons procurement and
maintenance of bases.
We interpretations our wage arrears estimates, presented below, in light of these
expectations by demographic features, job location, and occupation. Before proceeding to an
analysis of the univariate patterns of wage arrears, we briefly discuss our data sources and the
organization of our empirical results.
Our empirical analysis is based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS),
a nationally representative household-based panel of the Russian people. The survey project has
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currently gone through two phases, each phase comprising of a different panel of households for
which interviews were conducted with every member of the household. Phase I is composed of
four rounds of interviews conducted during 1992 and 1993; Phase II has to date undergone three
rounds of interviews, Rounds V-VII, each fielded in the Fall of 1994, 1995 and 1996,
respectively. The survey contains detailed information on demographic and employment
characteristics by occupation and job location which help us analyze the labor market
experiences of Russian households as the transition to a market economy has proceeded.10
Although the RLMS began in 1992, our analysis is restricted to the 1994-6 period
because data on unpaid wages only became available in Phase II of the survey. Respondents
were asked a series of questions concerning nonpayment of wages. Table 1 gives details of the
survey questions11 which form the focus of our investigation. These survey responses help us
gain new insights into the wage arrears crisis.
Our empirical results are organized as follows. In Tables 2-6, we report univariate
patterns, separately for each year under consideration, broken down by a number of demographic
attributes in order to uncover features of the nonpayments crisis that are masked by the aggregate
official statistics. Table 2 states the percentage of the sampled respondents that have not been
fully paid for their labor, the absolute average value of outstanding wages, and the ratio of
outstanding wage arrears to actual, per person monthly wages (as opposed to contracted wages
which are used later). Table 2.1 presents these wage nonpayment measures separately for men
and women. In the succeeding tables, we similarly report our wage arrear measures separately by
age in Table 3; by educational attainments in Tables 4.1 and 4.2; by eight major regional groups
in Tables 5.1 and 5.2; and finally, by major occupational groups in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. The
discussion of the univariate patterns of Tables 2-6 is extended into a multivariate analysis of the
frequency (among respondents) and magnitude of wage arrears over the 1994-96 period. These
10Information on the structure of the survey, the questionnaires, and data sources may be obtained
over the internet at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms.
nThese questions were asked of all respondents who indicated that they were either at work or on
unpaid or paid leave. However, our analysis focuses on arrears of the subset of respondents who were
receiving positive wages from their primary jobs at the time of the interviews.
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results are presented in Table 7. Our estimates of the correlation between regional wage levels (of
Table 7.1) and the regional ratios of the nonpayment frequencies among the relatively low and
high wage earners are stated in Table 7.2. Our measures of the respondents' expectations about
their well-being in the subsequent year are reported in Tables 8.1 and 8.2. Tables 9.1 and 9.2
present our analysis of the effect of wage arrears on the likelihood that a family will end up in
poverty. Patterns in the frequency (among respondents) and magnitude of barter arrangements
are stated in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 in which we empirically consider the relationship between
wage arrears and barter. These tables also report our estimates of outstanding net arrears, i.e.
wage arrears net of barter payments (both measured in rubles). Finally, we present our estimates
of the impact of wage arrears on supplemental activities such as secondary jobs and informal
(but paid) self-employment in Tables 11.1 and 11.2.
III. Univariate Patterns of Wage Arrears
We present these wage arrears patterns in Tables 2-6 limiting our analysis to people
aged 16-64 who reported that they were currently receiving positive wage payments.12
Each table records mean values of the relative frequencies of respondents denied wages
(Pjowed), the cumulated, average amounts withheld in constant 1995 December rubles
(Amtowed) and the ratios of these amounts with respect to average monthly wages (Amtw) from
1994 to 1996 by demographic characteristics followed by job location and occupation. These
estimates provide the impact of a given attribute, for example age, on the frequencies, amounts
and ratios of wage nonpayment without separating the influence of other factors. For example,
the youngest respondents may be denied less amounts than older workers not only because they
are concentrated in less paid occupations but also because they are less educated and therefore
earn less. The multivariate estimates of Table 7 with respect to each attribute have an edge over
these univariate estimates because we can measure the impact of age on wage nonpayment from
12The restriction to ages 16-64 reduces the sample of respondents with positive wages by 70 (1.9
percent), 72 (2.2 percent), and 48 (1.8 percent) people in 1994, 1995, and 1996 respectively. 67.34
percent, 67.0 percent and 65.58 percent of the respondents between the ages of 16 and 64 reported that
they were either at work or on unpaid or paid leave in 1994, 1995, and 1996 respectively. 75.2 percent,
70.9 percent, and 61.5 percent of these groups reported receiving wages in the three years.
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these estimates by controlling the values of other attributes such as occupation, job location,
education etc. at specified levels.
The univariate estimates however have a useful feature providing yearly wage
nonpayment trends for respondents grouped according to an attribute which can then be verified
in the multivariate specification. These mean estimates indicate if the frequencies, amounts and
ratios have a trend across age (five groups), education (seven levels), occupation (nine types), or
job location (eight regions) in a given year. For example, in Table 3, the mean estimates of the
frequencies and amounts of nonpayments by age go up from 17 to 45 years (divided in three age
groups) during 1994-96 but they tend to decline from 46 to 64 years (divided in two age groups).
This pattern needs to be investigated in a multivariate context: do the estimates of the
nonpayment frequencies and amounts of the multivariate specification with respect to age alone
support the univariate pattern of nonpayment improving with people over the age of 45 years
when the other attributes are fixed at specified levels?
With these qualifications, we proceed to analyze our univariate estimates of Tables 2 -6.
A major finding of the estimates is that the nonpayment situation had generally improved with
respect to the three measures in the tables in 1995. The frequencies, amounts, and the ratios (of
the amounts of nonpayments to monthly wages) had generally declined for the attributes from
table to table. (The 1995 declines are also seen in the charts.) Therefore, we omit 1995 from
our analysis in this section.
The percentage of people in our sample who were owed wages (row 1) increased from
29.72 percent in 1994 to 44.83 percent in 1996 in Table 2. Average (per person) outstanding
enterprise debt to workers (row 2) similarly increased from 769,855 rubles in 1994 to 1,082,462
rubles in 1996, expressed in constant December 1995 values.13 Calculated as ratios of average
13Our analysis here focuses on the first moment of the distribution. Information on the frequency
distribution of outstanding enterprise debts to workers reported in Appendix 2 brings out the pattern of the
higher moments of the distribution. Thus, in 1994 and 1995, the amounts owed tend to be concentrated
toward relatively lower values but in 1996, the degree of skewness falls and less of the probability mass is
concentrated in the left tail (with lower outstanding debts) suggesting a relative shift toward upper ranges
of the frequency distribution of outstanding enterprise debts to workers.
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(real) monthly wage (row 3)14, outstanding enterprise obligations to their employees increased
from approximately three times the monthly wage in 1994 to over five times in 1996. These
figures are higher than the aggregate numbers reported in Section I above.15
We see in Table 2.1 that males were more likely than females to be denied payment on
time, and also to be owed more wages when not fully paid on time. The difference in the
outstanding arrears between men and women tended to diminish between 1994 and 1996. This
narrowing reversed the gender pattern of the ratio by 1996: i.e. women were owed more
payments than men by 1996 when these are calculated as proportions of monthly wages. (The
narrowing of these gender differences is also evident in Figure 2.)
We see in Table 3 that wage nonpayment frequencies, amounts, and the ratios of
accumulated arrears to monthly wages increased for all age groups between 1994 and 1996.
Across the five age groups, the frequencies and amounts of nonpayments increased from 17 years
to 45 years (divided in three groups) and dropped thereafter from 46 to 64 years (distributed in
two groups). We do not detect a systematic pattern with respect to the inter-age group ratios.
Turning to wage nonpayment across educational groups in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, we notice
that the relative frequency of arrears among respondents, the ruble value of arrears, and the
accumulated arrears in relation to monthly wages increased between 1994 and 1996 for all
14The ratios in Tables 2-6 are calculated by dividing outstanding amounts owed to respondents at
the time of the interview with the actual wage payment in the preceding month. Given the prevalence of
wage nonpayment, actual payment in the previous month will often understate the contracted monthly
wage. This may explain why our estimates of the ratios of outstanding arrears to monthly wages are higher
than official aggregate estimates which use contracted monthly wages in the denominator. This problem
might be overcome by calculating a contracted wage for our sample respondent as the actual amount paid
plus some portion of the outstanding enterprise debt to the individual because the amount owed to the
worker is cumulative rather than incurred in the previous month. Since we know the number of months
over which the enterprise has owed wages to the worker, we can use the information to approximate the
fraction of outstanding debt with which to augment actual wage payment to the worker in the previous
month. This procedure which we employ in our subsequent analysis starting with Table 7 will be subject to
measurement error because we do not know the debt which was incurred in the past 30 days. This
problem with regard to wage nonpayment combined with the nonrandom distribution of the frequency and
magnitude of nonpayment across workers creates biases in the estimates of wage regressions using the
RLMS data set (see Newell and Reilly, 1996; Glinskaya and Mroz, 1996 for similar reservations).
15These estimates assume that wage rates are not affected by the increasing practice of firms to
avoid paying full wages to employees, although labor supply and demand may be affected by the practice
thereby influencing contracted wage levels.
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groups. Across the five education groups, we do not notice a distinct association of the frequency
and amount withheld with the education level.
The regional patterns of Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show that wage nonpayment had increased in
all the regions in terms of the three measures in 1996 compared to 1994. The frequency of wage
arrears was smaller among Moscow and St. Petersburg respondents than among those sampled
in other regions with the pattern holding for the years under consideration. For example, in 1996
about 26 percent of the Moscow and St. Petersburg respondents in the sample were owed wages,
whereas the percentage of people who were owed wages in the other regions varied from
approximately 37 percent in the Central and Central Black-Earth region to about 59 percent in
the Northern and North Western region.
As already noted, Moscow and St. Petersburg led the regions with the lowest frequency of
wage withholding and ranked second with respect to the ratio (of wage nonpayment to monthly
wage). The three regions of Central and Central Black-Earth, Volga-Vyatski and Volga Basin,
and North Caucasus were ahead of Moscow and St. Petersburg in terms of lower average amount
withheld evidently reflecting their lower average wages. Eastern Siberia and the Far East, and
the Northern and North Western regions (in that order) were the worst performers in terms of the
three measures with the Urals and Western Siberia below them (with increasing hardship) in the
ranking. We compare these regional patterns of univariate estimates with those resulting from
the multivariate specification of Table 7.
Patterns of wage arrears reported in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 reveal substantial variation in our
three measures of wage arrears across occupational groups.16
16Appendix 3 lists the four-digit occupational categories that were grouped into nine, one-digit
groups (see Appendix 1) by RLMS according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ISCO). To quote from a RLMS homepage document: "Occupations were coded according to the four-digit
International Standard Classification of Occupations: ISCO-88 (Geneva: International Labour Office,
1990). Considerable care was devoted to taking into account the idiosyncrasies of the Russian labor
market. For example, medsestra is normally translated to mean "nurse." The ISCO classifies nurses as
professionals and defines professionals as those involved in 'increasing the existing stock of knowledge,
applying scientific and artistic concepts and theories to the solution of problems, and teaching about the
foregoing in a systematic manner. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the fourth ISCO
skill level.' Since Russian nurses do not normally function at this level and were never considered to be
professionals in the former Soviet Union, they were classified at the level which the ISCO assigns to
nurses' aides in the West." We have deleted the 6000 group, "Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers"
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Regarding the frequency of payment arrears to respondents by occupation (Table 6.1), the
fractions which were denied wage payments increased in each group between 1994 and 1996, the
highest having been reported for 1996 in the military (at 92 percent), and the lowest in the
service and market sector (at 30 percent). In Table 6.2, outstanding payment arrears in constant
rubles had gone up among all groups; so had the ratio of outstanding amounts to monthly
wages except for a decline with respect to legislators, senior managers and officials who seemed
to have succeeded in raising their monthly wages.
What pattern do the estimates suggest in the three measures across the nine occupational
groups for 1994 and 1996? First, we take the inter-occupation frequencies and amounts of
nonpayments. Respondents in the lowest wage scales, among them the service and market
workers, clerks, and unskilled workers had generally the lowest frequencies and amounts of
nonpayments. These were followed by technicians, professionals, and craft and related trade
workers, the next higher in the pay scales, with higher frequencies and amounts of nonpayments.
The groups with the highest occurrences and amounts of nonpayments also with top pay scales
were plant and machine operators and assemblers, and army respondents (in 1996). Legislators,
senior managers and officials, incurred least frequent wage arrears (along with clerks) but their
amounts withheld were high close to those for machine and plant operators.
The inter-occupation ratios of nonpayments to monthly wages have an interesting pattern
in 1996. Legislators, senior managers and officials, and army respondents are at the top with the
lowest ratios (despite highest wage nonpayments) reflecting improved monthly wages for them.
A second interesting feature is the better performance of plant and machine operators and craft
workers with lower ratios who outstripped unskilled workers, professionals and clerks (who
were ahead with lower ratios in 1994) by evidently improving their monthly wages.
In conclusion, the frequencies, amounts and ratios of nonpayment to monthly wages rose
in 1996 compared to 1994 for all our univariate measures and attributes. These univariate
patterns of wage nonpayment by an attribute, for example, gender, education, age, occupation
and region need to be checked via a multivariate specification. For example, women turned out
due to insufficient observations.
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to be less discriminated than men with respect to the frequency and amounts of nonpayments; the
measures of frequencies and amounts rise up to a certain age and then decline. They also put
certain regions, Western Siberia, the Urals, Eastern Siberia and the Far East, and the North and
North-West (in that order of deteriorating performance) as the worst discriminated regions with
respect to wage nonpayment. Do these results survive in a multivariate specification?
IV. Patterns of Multivariate Wage Nonpayments
We extend the single variable approach of Tables 2-6 to a multivariate formulation in
which the frequency of being owed wages (Pjowed) and the ruble value of outstanding enterprise
debt to workers (Amtowed) are adopted as the dependent variables.17 The estimates are presented
in Table 7.18
Three caveats qualify our analysis of the multivariate specification of this and the
remaining sections. First, we adopt the group with secondary school training, the lowest in
formal schooling (Education 1), as our reference category. Second, we estimate the impact of
wage nonpayment by occupation in relation to the frequency and amount of nonpayment in the
service and market sector which is our benchmark occupation. We assume that employees in the
service and market sector were least vulnerable to the vagaries of wage nonpayment because the
sector has been the most dynamic in the economy with less cash-flow problems. Finally, we
accept Moscow and St. Petersburg, economically the most energetic in the transition, as the
reference region for our analysis of the regional pattern of wage nonpayment.
We notice that the univariate patterns of Tables 2-6 tend to persist when a number of
demographic, occupational, and job location explanatory variables are simultaneously introduced
in the two regressions.
17We express Amtowed as a natural log (in a single-log specification) in order to more readily
interpret covariate effects in percentage terms. Note that rather than estimate regressions with the
dependent variable defined as the ratio of amount owed to wage payment (Amtw), we include monthly
wage as a regressor.
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 The wage variable used in Table 7 and the subsequent tables is an estimate of contracted wages
which are actual wages paid plus an estimate of the monthly outstanding wage obligations by the
employers (calculated as the cumulated nonpayments divided by the number of months for which these
wages have been owed). Details are in footnote 14.
19
Thus, the coefficients of the year dummies (duml994 and duml995) in the first
regression suggest only a marginal increase, between 1994 and 1995, in the frequency of wage
nonpayment but a substantial rise in 1996 over 1994.19 Similarly, consistent with the patterns in
Table 2, the average value of outstanding wage debt fell between 1994 and 1995 by about 18
percent, but then increased by approximately 41 percent in 1996 over 1994.20
Regarding gender differentials, the positive coefficient of the female dummy in the first
regression suggests that female respondents were more likely to experience wage nonpayment
than men (contrary to our univariate mean estimates of Table 2.1), but the outstanding average
debt to female employees was less than for men (similar to the pattern of Table 2.1) as
suggested by the negative coefficient in the second regression. Univariate comparisons therefore
do not necessarily give unambiguous results. It would seem that wages of female employees,
whom managers tended to regard as second job holders with less maneuvrability in the work
place, were withheld more frequently but the amounts withheld were smaller because women
were concentrated in low-wage occupations.
The frequency and magnitude of arrears were likely to increase with age and subsequently
decline; for example, the coefficients of the quadratic formulation with respect to age indicate
that wage debt tended to be more frequent and larger with age up to approximately 35 years
declining thereafter. This finding supports similar results in Table 3 in terms of univariate mean
values.
Workers with longer tenure were more likely to be owed wages and the outstanding
arrears also tended to be larger (row 6, columns 2 and 3). The positive seniority effect may seem
surprising because we might expect senior workers to have greater maneuverability within the
19When we calculate the slope of the function at mean values for all explanatory variables, we find
that the likelihood of being owed wages was approximately 1.9 percent higher in 1995 than in 1994, and
about 15.6 percent higher in 1996 than in 1994. Similar calculations indicate that government employees
were about 7 percent more likely to be owed wages than nongovernment workers, and women were about
5.1 percent more likely to experience wage arrears than men. The slope transformations for the covariate
effects of Table 7 are available on request.
20These values are calculated from the coefficients of the year dummies in rows 1 and 2 of column
3 using the formula exp(x) - 1, which gives the approximate percentage effect of a dummy on the
dependent variable in a semi-log specification.
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organization with the potential of using it to avoid being subjected to wage nonpayment.21 The
higher frequency and larger amounts of wage nonpayment might result from higher wages
associated with longer tenure.
Respondents in government-owned enterprises were more likely to experience wage
arrears (row 7, column 2), but the accumulated arrears were no different from those for
nongovernmental employees (as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient estimate in row 7,
column 3).
Our estimates of the frequency and amount of wage arrears with respect to education
level do not show a systematic pattern and, in that regard, support our univariate estimates of
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 suggesting similar lack of association between wage nonpayment and
education level. The majority of the nonpayment frequency estimates are statistically not
significant suggesting that the workers in the different categories were likely to encounter wage
nonpayment frequencies no different from the arrear frequency of the reference group with
secondary education. The average amounts owed by education level, when they are statistically
significant, again fail to show a systematic association.
The regional patterns of the frequencies and amounts of outstanding arrears (rows 15-21,
column 3) are similar to the univariate results in picking out respondents in the Northern and
North Western region, Eastern Siberia and the Far Eastern Region, and Western Siberia (with
respect to amount only) —heavily resource-oriented and populated with high wage earners—as the
worst likely sufferers. Again, low-wage North Caucasus and Central and Central Chernozem
are singled out, same as in the univariate estimates, as the regions least likely to be hit by
nonpayment in terms of both measures.
Among the occupations, legislators, senior managers and officers as well as clerks were
as likely to incur wage nonpayment in frequency and amount as our reference category of service
and market worker. (The estimates are statistically not significant.) The former benefitted from
their decision making influence and the latter because of their low wages. Respondents in the
21In the Russian context, the positive effect may reflect managers reneging on seniority rights in
implicit contracts (Lazear, 1979) during adverse economic times (see Idson and Valletta, 1996, for
evidence of this practice in the U.S.).
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military were most likely to be subjected to wage nonpayment in frequency and amount. (Row
29, columns 2 and 3) These results are similar to those of Tables 6.1 and 6.2 with univariate
estimates. The amounts withheld were likely to be high as in Table 6.2 for the high wage
occupations of machine operators, craft workers and military respondents. Legislators, senior
managers and officials (despite high wages) were likely to suffer less wage arrears along with
unskilled workers, clerks, and professionals, (rows 22-28, columns 2 and 3).
Two noteworthy conclusions emerge from the estimates of the multivariate specification:
first, the frequencies and amounts of nonpayments are likely to be positively associated with
wage levels—the higher the wage level in terms of occupation (for example, machine operators,
assemblers, craft workers), region (rich in resources, among them Western Siberia, Eastern
Siberia and the Far East, the North and the North-West), and age (average wage rises with age
up to a point), the higher the frequency and amount withheld. Managerial decision making with
respect to wage nonpayment seemed to be tilted in favor of fairness rather than productivity
orientation assuming that higher wages reflected higher productivity.
Second, the exception to this pattern of the association of higher wage nonpayment (in
frequency and amount) with the wage level occurred paradoxically with two groups depending
on the weight they could exercise in influencing wage nonpayment decision making: Thus,
legislators, top managers, and officers were least likely to be discriminated against because they
could swing it in their favor despite their high wage levels, and women were likely to be less
favored than men despite having lower wages because they could not influence managerial
decision making.
Our analysis of the estimates of Table 7 brings us back to the issue we raised earlier,
namely, how did Russian managers select workers who should bear the brunt of implicit
downward wage adjustment via partial wage withholding? How did they resolve the conflict
inherent in the goal of maintaining equity among their workers while retaining their productive
employees? The pre-transition tradition of firms acting as production units and providers of
social services tended to uneasily coexist as growing market pressures and hardening budget
constraints required managers to use wages and employment policies less as mechanisms for
fulfilling social welfare goals and more for bottom line profit calculations. We address this issue
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by analyzing the data of Table 7.1 that reflect the influence of equity considerations in the
allocation of wage arrears.
V. Equity, Markets, and Wage Arrears
Table 7.1 provides evidence of the influence of equity concerns in the distribution of
wage arrear frequencies across high and low wage workers. Our empirical strategy is to evaluate
whether regions that were relatively poor, i.e. had relatively low real monthly wages (calculated
via regional price deflators), tended to have a lower likelihood of wage withholding from lower
wage workers than regions with relatively higher real wages. For each of the eight regional
groups, we calculate the ratio of the percentage of respondents with wages below the regional
median wage who are owed wages to the percentage of respondents with wages above the
regional median wage who are owed wages. Equity considerations in the distribution of wage
arrears will generally predict that this ratio should be lower (higher) in regions with relatively
lower (higher) average monthly real wages.
This prediction is largely borne out in Table 7.1 where we list regions from top to bottom
in descending order of average monthly real regional wages and report the relative frequencies of
wage arrears for low and high wage groups for each year and region. (Actual wage levels are
listed in parentheses below the name of each region.) The pattern of the regional frequency ratios
is not strictly monotonic,22 but the ratios generally decline as we move down each column
supporting out prediction. Again, the correlation between average regional real wages and the
entrees in the cells is positive for each year and significant for 1995 (at the 3 percent level) and
for 1996 (at the 8 percent level).
Similar correlation estimates linking wage nonpayment frequencies to wage levels by
occupation, age and education did not provide conclusive evidence in favor of the influence of
22When we aggregate the data for the three years, the correlation coefficients indicate a stronger
monotonic decline between the frequency ratios and regional wages. (These results are available on
request).
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23equity considerations in managerial decision making with regard to wage nonpayment.
VI. Wage Arrears, Expectations about the Future, and Poverty
How did wage arrears color peoples' expectations about their future well-being? Did
they make people feel poorer ? Did they result in higher poverty rates? Tables 8.1-9.2 provide
insights into these two questions.
We address the first question by constructing two measures of pessimism about the future
which are stated in Table 8.1. Comparing the mean values between rows in each panel, we see
that when people were currently owed wages, they expected their family to be worse off in the
next twelve months (Betwor) and more concerned about their ability to provide themselves with
the bare essentials in the next twelve months (Agetne).
It is possible that workers who were owed wages had demographic attributes (for
example, they were close to retirement or were poorly educated) that made them vulnerable in
the current economic situation or they lived in poor regions (North Caucasus, for example). In
other words, high wage arrears might be proxying the impact of these factors without
contributing per se to people's expectations about their future well-being. In Table 8.2, we
assess the relationship between wage arrears and pessimism about future well-being in a
multivariate context. In both regressions, the dependent variable is coded such that higher
values indicate greater pessimism about future well-being, i.e. a positive coefficient estimate
means that the attribute is associated with a more negative assessment about the future. For
example, the positive coefficient estimate of the female dummy (row 4) indicates that women
tended to be more pessimistic about their future economic well-being than men, while the
negative coefficient of the "education 6" dummy, representing university graduates, indicates that
people with this education level were likley to be more optimistic about their future prospects
(than those in the reference category of secondary education) after taking into account their
contracted wage levels, age, current tenure, and so forth. The striking conclusion of relevance
23We intend examining this issue further by disaggregating the data and adopting other measures
such as the decile ratio of the bottom and the top ten percent wage earners for estimating the correlation
between the wage level and the frequency and amount of wage nonpayment.
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here is that, after we statistically control for personal attributes, occupational differences, and job
location, we notice that wage arrears exerted a significant effect on future expectations, raising
concern about future well-being (as seen from the positive coefficients on Pjowed in columns 2
and 3).
We extend the analysis further in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 by exploring the effect of wage
arrears on the actual incidence of poverty rather than on expectations about future well-being.24
Three conclusions follow from the analysis. Poverty, measured in terms of percentage of
respondents below the poverty line, had increased in Russia during the transition irrespective of
whether they were owed wages. The incidence of poverty, based on the percentage of people who
were in families with income below regional poverty thresholds,25 had increased more rapidly
between 1994 and 1996 for people who were owed wages. Finally, the percentage in poverty
was higher in all years for people who were owed wages.
This impact of wage arrears on poverty in Table 9.2 remains highly significant when we
control for demographic and job market attributes of the respondents. Based on the estimates of
the second specification (column 2), women were more likely to be in poverty (the coefficient
of the female dummy is positive at 0.0772); higher education groups generally were less likely
to experience poverty (the coefficients are negative); and the occurrence of poverty was higher in
most regions relative to that in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Again, the effect of wage arrears on
the likelihood of a family being in poverty increased in 1996, as reflected by the significant and
positive interaction effect. Thus, in specification (2) we see that the effect of wage arrears on the
likelihood of being in poverty in 1994, which is 0.4924 (row 3), rises to 0.7563 (0.4942+0.2621,
from rows 3 and 5) in 1996. The impact of wage arrears on poverty had increased in 1996.
VII. Barter and Wage Arrears
24See Milanovic (1996), and Gregory (1997) for discussions of trends in Russian poverty and
issues relating to its measurement.
25These thresholds are based on income requirements needed to meet minimum nutritional norms.
Given the important role of social transfers and intra-family transfers (see Cox, Eser, and Jimenez, 1995),
household expenditure might be a preferred measure of living standards (see Mikhalev, 1996). We intend
pursuing this line of inquiry based on the RLMS data set in a separate paper.
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Along with escalating wage arrears, barter arrangements between enterprises and their
employees and among enterprises as payments for their output have increased in Russia. Forms
of near money that provide liquidity, facilitate transactions, and contribute to price flexibility
have also appeared (see Woodruff, 1996). Liquidity constraints have evidently contributed to
wage arrears and barter of goods for labor services in Russia.26
We note in Table 10.1 that the prevalence and ruble value of barter transactions between
enterprises and their employees had decreased between 1994 and 1995, followed by a strong
rebound in 1996, producing a significant increase in the occurrence, but not in the value of barter
over the three year period. When we analyze these patterns in a multivariate context in Table
10.2, the decline between 1994 and 1995 in the probability of occurrence and in the value of
barter is significant (row 1 of regressions 1-3), but the increase between 1994 and 1996 is not
significant (row 2 of regressions 1-3).
Turning to the demographic distribution of the frequency and magnitude of barter, we
notice in regression (1) that women were generally less likely to receive barter. When we restrict
the analysis to workers who were currently owed wages in regression (2), we see that there was
no relationship between gender and the likelihood of receiving barter. It appears that among
workers who were not owed wages, men were more likely than women to receive pay in term of
goods, but there was no difference among workers who were currently owed wages.
Turning to the effect of other explanatory variables, we fail to see a connection between
tenure and the likelihood or value of barter. We notice that the likelihood of receipt of goods and
their value increased with age to approximately 35-40 years old declining thereafter. Budget
sector workers were significantly less likely to receive barter payments (row 9, regressions 1 and
2); when they did, these payments were no different from those received by nongovernmental
workers. Again, barter was more common in most regions than in Moscow and St. Petersburg
(evidenced by the positive coefficients of the region dummies in regressions 1 and 2), but
conditional on receiving partial payment in goods, these payments, on average, do not suggest a
26Pendergast and Stole (1996) provide arguments for barter within organizations that are not based
on liquidity constraints per se. Among these are the ability of enterprises to reduce excess inventories
creating negotiations between enterprises and workers for mutually beneficial barter arrangements (see
Roha and Schulhof, 1996), and use goods as a source of price flexibility (see Stigler, 1969).
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regional pattern (the regional dummies in regression 3 are statistically not significant).
While trends in barter between 1994 and 1996 are relevant to our analysis, our central
focus is to check if barter transactions responded to the presence of wage arrears. The positive
coefficient of pjowed (row 3, regression 1) indicates that the likelihood of receiving barter was
greater for respondents who were owed wages. Again, the significantly positive coefficient of
in(Amtowed), the amount of outstanding wage arrears owed to employees (row 4, regression 2),
indicates that, for individuals who were owed wages, the likelihood of receiving goods increased
with the ruble value of outstanding arrears.27 Finally, the significantly positive coefficients of
in(Amtowed) (row 4, regression 3 ) indicates that the value of the goods received, conditional on
receipt of goods, also increased with the ruble value of outstanding arrears. These results
provide evidence that barter transactions arose partly in response to wage arrears.28
Finally, we analyze the patterns of enterprise net debts to employees by measuring the
differences between outstanding wage arrears and goods received, both calculated in rubles.
When we compare the mean net debts of Table 10.2 (last row) to those reported in Table 2 (row
2), we observe that goods received by employees have only a marginal effect on outstanding
enterprise debts to employees.29 We also notice from the estimates (last column) that the sign
and magnitude of the coefficients of the regressors are generally similar to those for
27In regression (2), we restrict the analysis to respondents who were currently owed wages.
Therefore, the estimate of the variable in(Amtowed) reflects the effect of the change in the value of
outstanding debt to a worker per se rather than a combination of this effect and the likelihood of having his
wage withheld, i.e. of observing a positive value for the variable Amtowed.
28If enterprise managers undertake barter transactions for enforcing wage flexibility in the presence
of downwardly rigid nominal wages, then barter may decline if market forces result in lower wages.
Markets require incentives for efficient functioning, but traditions, administrative rules, and political
considerations may work against wage flexibility. In that case, barter practices may increase. If firms
resort to barter in response to liquidity constraints, then the prevalence and magnitude of barter may
increase unless the macroeconomic environment improves and the nonpayments crisis is resolved.
29The values of Goodsv and Amtowed-Goodsv in Table 10.1 (rows 1 and 2) may seem at variance
with the values reported for Amtowed in Table 2 (row 2). In other words, subtracting Goodsv of Table
10.1 from Amtowed of Table 2 yields a smaller value of Amtowed-Goodsv than is reported in the last row
of Table 10.1. These values are however consistent because the values for Goodsv reported in Table 10.1
(row 2) are calculated on the basis of the subset of people who received goods in lieu of wages, whereas
(Amtowed-Goodsv) involves all respondents who were owed wages, i.e.for calculating net debt, we set
Goodsv equal to zero for people who were owed wages but who did not receive goods in lieu of wages.
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ln(Amtowed) reported in Table 7. Therefore, while barter payments may have the potential to
mitigate the hardships to which employees are subjected by wage nonpayment, it appears that
the magnitude and prevalence of payment in goods and services in lieu of wages to the sampled
Russian households were so small that they were unlikely to counteract the adverse impact of
wage arrears.
VIII. Wage Arrears and Supplemental Economic Activity
We finally investigate the effect of nonpayment of wages on multiple job holding and
informal, supplemental work for pay. Traditional models of moonlighting behavior argue that
workers take second jobs when they are underemployed on their main job, defined as desiring
more work hours than their main employer makes available to them, i.e. the wage rate on their
main job is greater than their marginal rate of substitution between earnings (consumption) and
leisure at current hours of work.30 This framework assumes that workers are paid for the hours
that they work, i.e. they are underemployed if they want to earn more income by working more
(paid) hours. Nonpayment of wages may be seen in a similar light: workers, unable to generate
their desired income on their primary jobs31, engage in supplemental employment in order to
meet their income goals. It would therefore not be surprising to find that the wage arrears crisis
has real effects on the economy, in addition to those generated by induced changes in
expenditure, in that labor supply responses are induced in the form of supplemental economic
activity.32
We consider two forms of secondary economic activity. The variable adpdjb is a dummy
30See Shisko and Rostker (1976), and Paxson and Sicherman (1996) for discussions of theoretical
models of multiple job holding decisions.
31Depending on management behavior is might be more accurate to model the labor supply effects
of wage arrears as a cut in wage rates (in the case where management tends to withhold pay based on a
percentage of earnings), or a limitation on available paid hours (in the case where management tends to
cease payments after a certain threshold level of earnings is reached).
Wage arrears may also produce labor supply effects in primary employment, i.e. increase quits
from enterprises and sectors that fail to fully pay their wage obligations. The Soviet-era linkage of social
services and housing to the employing enterprise limits these mobility responses.
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that indicates whether or not a person holds a second job for pay, which we call formal
secondary employment. The variable engiea is a dummy that indicates whether or not the
respondent does any additional work for pay, although the actual survey question (see Table
11.1) clearly addresses less formal forms of work, largely self-employment activities. While the
latter survey question was asked of all respondents, the former was only asked of people who
reported that they currently held a job. As noted above, we have restricted our sample to people
who indicated that they held a job (the wage arrears questions were only asked of these people),
and we further impose the sample restriction of positive wage payments, thereby deleting from
the sample people who held jobs but were currently on voluntary or involuntary leave. While the
variable adpdjb will tend to capture more formal supplemental work, and the variable engiea will
reflect less formal supplemental work and was addressed to a wider group of respondents, our
sample restrictions ensure that in both cases we are looking at a similar group of people.33
The simple univariate patterns in Table 11.1 suggest that, in 1995 and 1996, people who
were owed wages were more likely to hold second jobs {adpdjb), and, in all years, people who
were owed wages, were more likely to engage in supplemental individual economic activity
{engiea). We also see, from the significantly positive coefficient of Pjowed in Table 11.2, that
this relationship remains robust when we include other covariates, providing compelling
evidence that wage nonpayment had distinct labor supply effects with respect to multiple job
holding and less formal supplemental work. While wage arrears provided downward wage
flexibility allowing firms to retain redundant workers, they also acted to stimulate employment
(measured by total hours worked) and output through these induced labor supply effects. It is also
interesting to note that women were less likely to engage in supplemental work activities,
33These sample restrictions might bias our estimates of supplemental work activity and the
effectsof arrears on supplemental labor supply decisions because people on leave will tend to have
different incentives for engaging in supplemental work from those currently receiving wages. The
direction of the bias is also not obvious because those on voluntary leave, including maternity leave, might
have relatively high reservation wages during their leave and hence be less likely to find alternative work,
while those on involuntary leave may be in greater need of supplemental income. We hope to extend the
analysis and consider the effects of these restrictions more fully in future work.
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possibly due to family obligations.34 When we split the sample by gender (not shown), we also
find that wage arrears had a significant and positive effect on supplemental labor supply for men,
but an insignificant (though positive) effect for women, reflecting either family constraints or
possibly the influence of secondary-earner-status of many women.35
IX. Summary
In this paper, we have developed a statistical profile of the impact of wage arrears on
Russian workers grouped by demographic features, occupation and job location.
We argue that wage nonpayment, which peaked in 1996, was brought on by cash flow
problems in the government sector and privatized enterprises. It was further accentuated by the
traditional reluctance of managers to lay off workers and facilitated by the widespread weakening
of contractual obligations on the part of employers. In particular, enterprise managers could be
seen as devising strategies of wage nonpayment which best helped them lower wage outlays and
maintain or increase sales revenues. They could hold on to the better paid, more productive
workers in the interest of maintaining revenue inflows (the productivity orientation strategy) or
retain and pay the low paid workers, playing fair by them while maintaining the wage bill.
Among our major findings, based on a multivariate specification incorporating the
demographic, occupation and job location variables, are the following:
The relative frequency of workers denied wages and the amount of wage nonpayment in
constant rubles sharply increased in 1996.
Female workers were denied wages more frequently than male employees evidently
suggesting their less bargaining power. The outstanding average debt to female employees was
however less than that for men reflecting women workers' concentration in low paid jobs.
Nonpayment likelihood increased with age up to approximately 37 years, falling
34We intend analyzing this provisional hypothesis in future work by looking at the effects of
marriage and children on labor supply behavior.
35We plan to assess this possibility by incorporating total family earnings, especially spousal
earnings, into the analysis, in addition to looking at the effect of wages rates on secondary jobs for men and
women in order to look at the effects of opportunities in the secondary job market for men and women on
secondary labor supply decisions.
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thereafter. This feature approximately follows the pattern of average monthly wage initially
rising with age and then declining.
Wage arrears likelihood and amounts increased with job tenure.
The likelihood and amount of nonpayment were generally higher in all regions relative to
Moscow and St. Petersburg, revealing increasing nonpayment in frequency and amount as one
moved up from the lower wage to the higher wage, resource-rich regions. Our statistical test
supports this regional pattern suggesting that equity considerations in favor of the relatively less
well off workers in the poorer regions may have influenced wage nonpayment decisions.
The likelihood and amount of nonpayment also increased from the low paid occupations
(among them unskilled workers and clerks) to the high paid jobs (such as those of machine
operators). However, our statistical test does not support an association between the frequency
of nonpayment rising with average wage level.
The practice of nonpayment increased the likelihood that families would be actually
pushed into poverty and that they would expect to live in poverty in the immediate future.
While payment in the form of goods in lieu of wages has the potential of mitigating the
adverse effects of wage arrears, the frequency and magnitude of barter in our sample were not
sufficient to have a significant effect.
Finally, wage nonpayment had increased the likelihood of workers holding additional
jobs and undertaking informal paid activity.
In conclusion, our sample, covering respondents from the age of 16 to 64 and receiving
positive wages at the time of the interviews, excludes Russia's unemployed-currently estimated
at 10 percent of the workforce--, and the pensioners who have been pushed below poverty levels.
From this perspective, our sample deals with a special group of losers in Russia's market
transition. Nevertheless, our analysis of the wage arrears phenomenon, unique to Russia,
provides important conclusions relating to its impact on Russian households divided by their
demographic features, occupations and job locations.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Questionnaire Items





"At the present time, does your place of work owe you any money,
which for various reasons was not paid on time?" We coded this
question into a dummy variable which is 1 if the respondent said "Yes",
and is 0 if the respondent said "No".
"How much money in all have they not paid you?" Respondents
skipped this question if they answered that their employer did not owe
them wages. (The amount owed was adjusted to December 1995
rubles.)





"Have you received in the last 30 days at this enterprise in lieu of
payment for your labor something from its production or from the
production of another enterprise?" We coded this question into a
dummy variable which is 1 if the respondent said "Yes"; it is 0 if the
respondent said "No"; the variable was left out if the respondent was not
owed any wages (i.e. Pjowed equals 0).
"Estimate, please, how much the product you received cost in rubles,
regardless of what you did with it?" Respondents skipped this question
if they answered that they did not receive goods in lieu of wages (i.e.
Goodsp equals 0). (The amount is deflated to December 1995 rubles.)
NOTES: Monthly wages, used as the denominator for Amtw, are taken from the questionnaire
item, "how much money in the last 30 days did you receive from your primary workplace after
taxes? If you received all or part of the money in foreign currency, please convert all into
rubles, and name the total sum." In the tables that follow, we deleted the responses when the
individual reported either zero monthly wage or monthly wage in excess of 5,000,000 real
rubles (with December 1995 as the base year and month).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Currently Employed Respondents),
Wage Arrears on the Primary Job
Wage Arrears 1994 1995 1996
Pjowed: Percentage of people who are
owed wages
Amtowed: Average wages owed
Amtw: Average ratio of wages owed to
monthly wages received
NOTES: Annual averages are reported with standard deviations in parentheses. The sample
sizes are stated in square brackets. The questionnaire items that are used in the construction of
the above variables are stated in Table 1. The variable names are listed above in bold letters.
Superscripts a, b, and c denote significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between 1994


























Table 2.1: Gender Patterns in Wage Arrear Frequencies (Pjowed), Amounts of






















Female 2.676d 2.634d 5.252b'c'd
Male 3.573 3.447 4.927b'c
NOTES: The cells report the values for each variable separately for females and males. We
restrict the analysis to respondents who reported positive wages. Superscripts a, b, c, and d
denote significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between 1994 and 1995, 1995 and 1996,



















































































NOTES: Each cell reports the percentage of respondents in each age group that are currently
owed wages by their employers (Pjowed) in the first row; the average outstanding wage arrears
(Amtowed) in the second row, and the average ratio of outstanding wage arrears to monthly
wages received (Amtw) in the third row. We restrict the analysis to respondents who reported
positive wages. The sample sizes of respondents with positive wages in each age group are
reported in square brackets. The last three rows report the standard deviations in mean values
and the coefficients of variation for Pjowed, Amtowed, and Amtw across education groups.
Superscripts a, b, c, and d denote significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between 1994
and 1995,1995 and 1996, 1994 and 1996, respectively. Superscripts d, e, f, and g denote
significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between 1) each age group and the 17-25









































































NOTES: Each cell reports the percentage of respondents in each education group that are
currently owed wages by their employers. The sample sizes are reported in square brackets.
We restrict the analysis to respondents who reported positive wages. The last row states the
standard deviations in mean values and the coefficients of variation across education groups.
Superscripts a, b, c, and d denote significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between 1994
and 1995, 1995 and 1996, 1994 and 1996, and between the "no training besides secondary
school" category and the indicated educational category, respectively.
*PTU, FZU and FZO represent professional/technical trade school, factory/manufacturing trade
school (a training program located in factories), and factory/manufacturing department (a
specific type of training program), respectively.
Table 4.2: Amtowed and Amtw by Education Groups
Education Group 1994 1995 1996
No training besides 664,890 627,622 827,353ab
secondary school 2.556 3.189 3.994C
[129] [95] [93]














































































NOTES: Each cell reports the average outstanding wage arrears, Amtowed, in the first row ,
and the average ratio of outstanding wage arrears to monthly wages received, Amtw, in the
second row. The sample sizes are reported in square brackets. We restrict the analysis to
respondents who reported positive wages. The last two rows report the standard deviations in
mean values and the coefficients of variation across education groups. Superscripts a, b, c, and
d denote significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between 1994 and 1995,1995 and
1996,1994 and 1996, and between the "no training besides secondary school" category and
the indicated educational category, respectively.
*See note to Table 5.1
Table 5.1: Pjowed by Region



































































NOTES: Each cell reports the percentage of respondents in each region that are currently owed
wages by their employers. The sample sizes are reported in square brackets. We restrict the
analysis to respondents who reported positive wages. The last row states the standard
deviations in mean values and the coefficients of variation across regions. Superscripts a, b,
and c denote significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between 1994 and 1995, 1995 and




































































































NOTES: Each cell reports average outstanding wage arrears, Amtowed, in the first row and
the average ratio of outstanding wage arrears to monthly wages received, Amtw, in the second
row. The sample sizes are reported in square brackets. We restrict the analysis to respondents
who reported positive wages and positive outstanding wage arrears. The last two rows report
the standard deviations in mean values and the coefficients of variation across regions.
Superscripts a, b, and c denote significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between 1994
















































































NOTES: Each cell reports the percentage of respondents in each occupation that are currently
owed wages by their employers. The sample sizes are reported in square brackets. We restrict
the analysis to respondents who reported positive wages. The last two rows report the
standard deviations in mean values and the coefficients of variation across occupations.
Superscripts a, b, and c denote significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between 1994
















































































































NOTES: Each cell reports the average outstanding wage arrears, Amtowed, in the first row
and the average ratio of outstanding wage arrears to monthly wages received, Amtw. The
sample sizes are reported in square brackets. We restrict the analysis to respondents who
reported positive wages. The last two rows report the standard deviations in mean values and
the coefficients of variation across occupations. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significant
differences (at 10 percent or better) between 1994 and 1995, 1995 and 1996, and 1994 and
1996, respectively.



































































(continued on the next page)














































NOTES: 1. The first regression (Pjowed) is estimated by maximum
likelihood probit. The second regression ln(Amtowed) is estimated by
ordinary least squares, with the sample restricted to people who
reported wage nonpayment.
2. The coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in
parentheses. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, and
15 percent evels are denoted by superscripts a, b, c, and d respectively.
3. The rows labeled Test 1, Test 2, and Test 3 report joint significance
test statistics for the six education dummies, the seven regional
dummies, and the eight occupation dummies, respectively.




Legislator, Senior Manager, Official
Plant or Machine Operator or Assembler
Craft or Related Trades
Professional
Technician, Associate Professional







PTU with a secondary education








































































NOTES: Occupation, education, and age groups are listed in descending order of 1994
wages. The cell values are mean real monthly wages for each demographic group. The
standard deviations are available on request.
Table 7.2: Equity Considerations and Wage Arrears:
Regional Pjowed Among Relatively Low and High Wage Earners
Western Siberia
(1,031,608; 1,113,793; 1,312,666)
Northern and North Western
(1,020,819; 915,112; 1,221,732)
Moscow and St. Petersburg
(899,332; 859,997; 1,024,842)








Volga-Vyatski and Volga Basin
(484,549; 468,029; 559,816)
Correlation between
wage levels and cell entries
(significance level in parentheses)
NOTES: The regions are listed in descending order of average wage in each region
(based on the average wage over the three year period 1994-96); average wages for
1994,1995 , and 1996 are listed in that order in parentheses between each region.
Each cell reports the ratio of the percentage of people in the region with wages
below the median wage who are owed wages to the percentage with wages above


































Table 8.1: Assessment of Future Welfare By Respondents and Wage Arrears
Betwor
"Do you think that in the next 12 months you and your family will live better than
today, or worse?" The responses are coded from 1 representing "much better"


















"How concerned are you about the possibility that you might not be able to
provide yourself with the bare essentials in the next 12 months?" The responses
are coded from 1 representing "not concerned" through 5 representing "very
concerned."
1994 1995 1996
Owed Wages 4.2486a 4.2389a 4.3068a
(Pjowed=l) [869] [745] [942]
Not Owed Wages 4.0399 4.0623 3.9610
(Pjowed=0) [2,431] [2,150] [1,360]
NOTES: Each cell reports the mean value for a given variable separately for
respondents who are and who are not owed wages. The sample sizes are reported
in square brackets. We restrict the analysis to respondents who report positive
wages. Superscript a denotes significant differences (at 10 percent or better), for
each year, between respondents who are and who are not owed wages.







































































(continued on the next page)
Table 8.2: Multivariate Estimates of Respondents' Concerns About











































NOTES: l.The regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood
ordered probit.
2. The coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in
parentheses. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent and
15 percent levels are denoted by superscripts a, b, c, and d respectively.
3. The rows labeled Test 1, Test 2, and Test 3 report joint significance
test statistics for the six education dummies, the seven regional
dummies, and the eight occupation dummies, respectively.
Not Owed Arrears
Owed Arrears











NOTE: Each cell entry gives the percentage of respondents from age 16 to 64 in families with
family incomes below regional poverty thresholds. The first row gives poverty percentages for
respondents who reported that they were owed wages by their employers; the second row
gives poverty percentages for people who did not report that they were owed wages by their
employers. Superscripts a,b,c indicate significant differences (at 10 percent or better) in
poverty rates between respondents based on whether or not they are owed wages by their





































































































(continued on the next page)






































































NOTES: 1. The regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood
probit. The sample size is 7,491.
2. The coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in
parentheses. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent
levels are denoted by superscripts a, b, and c, respectively.
3. The rows labeled Test 1, Test 2, and Test 3 report joint significance
test statistics for the six education dummies, the seven regional
dummies, and the eight occupation dummies, respectively.
4. For both regressions, the dependent variable is Pindex which is
defined as 1 if the family income (adjusted for family structure) fell
below the poverty threshold, and as 0 if the family income did not fall













Table 10.1 Barter and Net Outstanding Payments Arrears
1994 1995 1996
Barter
Goodsp: the percentage of respondents
who are currently owed wages that have
received at least partial payment in goods
Goodsv: the average value of goods
received by respondents who have
received goods in lieu of wage payments
The Value of Net Outstanding Payment Arrears
Amtowed-Goodsv 738,655 672,910a l,037,080bc
[862] [733] [919]
NOTES: Mean values are reported with sample sizes in parentheses. We restrict
the analysis to respondents who reported positive wages and who were owed
wages by their employer (i.e. if pjowed=l). Superscripts a, b, and c denote
significant differences (at 10 percent or better) between 1994 and 1995, 1995 and
1996, and 1994 and 1996, respectively (superscript d denotes a significant
difference at 15 percent). Values reported for the variable (Goodsp) each year are
the percentage of respondents who received goods in lieu of wage payments
(restricted to people for whom pjowed=l). The cell entries for the variable
(Goodsv) is the average ruble value of goods received, in lieu of wage payments,
for those respondents who did receive goods (i.e. if Goodsp=l). The entries for
the variable (Amtowed-Goodsv) represent the average ruble value of outstanding
wage arrears net of compensating payments in terms of goods (calculated for














































































































































































































































































































NOTES: 1. Regressions (1) and (2) are estimated by maximum likelihood probit. Regression (3) is
estimated by maximum likelihood tobit. Regression (4) is estimated by ordinary least squares.
2. The coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1
percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent levels are denoted by superscripts a, b,c, and d,
respectively.
3. The rows labeled Test 1, Test 2, and Test 3 report joint significance test statistics for the six education
dummies, the seven regional dummies, and the eight occupation dummies, respectively.
4. The sample for regressions other than (1) is restricted to people who indicated that they were owed
wages by their employers (i.e. if pjowed=l); regression (3) is additionally limited to people who
reported receiving goods in lieu of wage payments (i.e. if Goodsp=l).
5. Respondents in the military are deleted because none of the people serving in the military reported
receiving goods in lieu of wages (i.e. Goodsp=0 for all respondents in the military).
* 6. Education categories 6 and 7 have been combined into a single variable (=1 if either education 6=1
or education 7=1) for the first two regressions because none of the respondents with education 7=1
received goods in lieu of wages (i.e. Goodsp=0 for all respondents with education 7=1).
Table 11.1: Wage Arrears and Secondary Economic Activity
Adpdjb
"Tell me, please, do you have some other kind of work?" The responses are coded



















"Tell me, please, in the last 30 days did you engage in some
additional kind of work for which you got paid? Maybe you sewed
someone a dress, gave someone a ride in a car, assisted someone with
apartment or car repairs, purchased and delivered food, looked after
a sick person, or did something else that you were paid for?" The responses are
coded as 1 if the answer is "yes" and as 0 if the answer is "no."
1994 1995 1996
Owed Wages 8.955a 7.363a 7.864a
(Pjowed=l) [871] [747] [942]
Not Owed Wages 7.435 4.912 4.814
(Pjowed=0) [2,448] [2,158] [1,360]
NOTES: Each cell reports the mean value (multipled by 100) for the relevant
dummy variable separately for respondents who were, and who were not owed
wages. The sample sizes are reported in square brackets. We restrict the analysis
to respondents who reported positive wages. Superscript a denotes significant
differences (at 10 percent or better), for each year, between respondents who were,
and who were not owed wages.
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NOTES: 1 .The regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood
ordered probit.
2. The coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in
parentheses. Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, and
15 percent levels are denoted by superscripts a, b, c, and d respectively.
3. The rows labeled Test 1, Test 2, and Test 3 report joint signifcance
test statistics for the six education dummies, the seven regional
dummies, and the eight occupation dummies, respectively.
Appendix Table 1: Additional Variable Definitions
Explanatory
Variable Definition
duml995 dummy=l for Round VI (1995) data
duml996 dummy=l for Round VII (1994) data
Female dummy=l if female
Education 1 dummy=l if no training besides secondary school (reference category)
Education 2 dummy=l if professional courses (i.e. chauffeuring, typing, accounting)
Education 3 dummy=l if PTU, FZU, FZO (see Table 5.1 note for details), without
a secondary education
Education 4 dummy=l if PTU with a secondary education
Education 5 dummy=l if technical, medical, music, pedagogical, art school
Education 6 dummy=l if institute, university, academy
Education 7 dummy=l if graduate school, residency
Age respondent age (restricted to ages 16-64)
Tenure months employed on current job
Government dummy=l if employed by a firm at least partly owned by the government
In (rmwage) logarithm of real monthly wage payments
Region 1 dummy=l if Moscow and St. Petersburg (reference category)
Region 2 dummy=l if Northern and North Western
Region 3 dummy=l if Central and Central Black-Earth
Region 4 dummy=l if Volga-Vyatski and Volga Basin
Region 5 dummy=l if North Caucasus
Region 6 dummy=l if Urals
Region 7 dummy=l if Western Siberia
Region 8 dummy=l if Eastern Siberia or Far Eastern
(continued on the next page)
Appendix Table 1: Additional Variable Definitions (continued)
Variable Definition
Occupation 1 dummy=l if a Legislator, Senior Manager, or Official (1110-1590)
Occupation 2 dummy=l if a Professional (2000-2460)
Occupation 3 dummy=l if a Technician, or Associate Professional (3111 -3480)
Occupation 4 dummy=l if a Clerk (4000-4223)
Occupation 5 dummy=l if a Service, or Market Worker (5100-5230, reference category)
Occupation 6 dummy=l if in a Craft or Related Trades (7000-7442)
Occupation 7 dummy=l if a Plant or Machine Operator or Assembler (8000-8340)
Occupation 8 dummy=l if in an Elementary (Unskilled) Occupation (9111-9999)
Military dummy= 1 if in the Army (0110)
Respondent's concerns about their future welfare and the Poverty Index:
Betwor response to the question, "do you think that in the next 12 months you and
your family will live better than today, or worse?" Coded from 1 to 5,
where 1 = "You will live much better," 2 = "You will live somewhat
better," 3 = "Nothing will change," 4 = "You will live somewhat worse,"
and 5 = "You will live much worse".
Agetne response to the question, "how concerned are you about the possibility that
you might not be able to provide yourself with the bare essentials in the
next 12 months?" Coded from 1 to 5, where 1 = "Not at all concerned," 2
= "Not too concerned," 3 = Both yes and no," 4 = "A little concerned," and
5 = "Very concerned".
P_index dummy=l if family income (adjusted for the structure of the family, i.e.
number and age of children, number and gender of adults, number of
elderly) falls below the poverty threshold, and =0 if family income does
not fall below the poverty threshold. The threshold is calculated on the
basis of a subsistence minimum consumption bundle, using subsistence
food amounts for approximately 55 food items for five demographic
groups (young children, older children, adult males, adult females, and the
elderly), and regional average prices for each item (for ten regions).
NOTE: The numbers in parentheses after the one-digit occupation groups are the four-digit
occupation groups, reported in Appendix 3, that comprise each category.




























































Sample size 884 758 976
NOTE: Each cell reports the percentage of working respondents with positive wage arrears
(i.e. those reporting positive monthly wage payments and who were owed wages), whose
outstanding nonpayment fell into the relevant category.
Appendix 3: Four-digit Occupation Codes
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)
1110 Legislators
1120 Senior government officials
1130 Traditional chiefs and heads of villages
1141 Senior officials of political-party organizations; revolutionaries
1142 Senior officials of employers', workers' and other economic-interest
organizations
1143 Senior officials of humanitarian and other special-interest organizations
1210 Directors and chief executives
1221 Production and operations department managers in agriculture, hunting,
forestry and fishing
1222 Production and operations department managers in manufacturing
1223 Production and operations department managers in construction
1224 Production and operations department managers in wholesale and retail trade
1225 Production and operations department managers in restaurants and hotels
1226 Production and operations department managers in transport, storage and
communications
1227 Production and operations department managers in business services
1228 Production and operations department managers in personal care, cleaning
and related services
1229 Production and operations department managers not elsewhere classified
1231 Finance and administration department managers
1232 Personnel and industrial relations department managers
1233 Sales and marketing department managers
1234 Advertising and public relations department managers
1235 Supply and distribution department managers
1236 Computing services department managers
1237 Research and development department managers
1239 Other department managers not elsewhere classified
1299 Landowners; gentry (pomeshchik)
1311 General managers in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
1312 General managers in manufacturing
1313 General managers in construction
1314 General managers in wholesale and retail trade
1315 Commandants (not military); administrator with higher or specialized
secondary education
1316 General managers in transport, storage and communications
1317 General managers of business services
1318 General managers in personal care, cleaning and related services
1319 General managers not elsewhere classified
1510 Master with higher education; steward; bailiff (prikazchik)
1520 Landowner; khoziain; edinolichnik; building owner
1530 Coop owner
1540 Dvorianin; noblemen; shliakhta; prince; statskii covetnik
1550 Small business owner
1590 Other
2000 "Intelligentsia;" scientific worker, NEC
2111 Physicists and astronomers
2112 Meteorologists
2113 Chemists
2114 Geologists and geophysicists
2121 Mathematicians and related professionals
2122 Statisticians
2131 Computer systems designers and analysts
2132 Computer programmers
2139 Computing professionals not elsewhere classified
2141 Architects, town and traffic planners
2142 Civil engineers
2143 Electrical engineers
2144 Electronics and telecommunications engineers
2145 Mechanical engineers
2146 Chemical engineers
2147 Mining engineers, metallurgists and related professionals
2148 Cartographers and surveyors
2149 Architects, engineers and related professionals not elsewhere specified,
engineers with higher education n.e.c.
2211 Biologists, botanists, zoologists and related professionals
2212 Pharmacologists, pathologists and related professionals





2229 Health professionals (except nursing) not elsewhere classified (medik with
higher education)
2230 Nursing and midwifery professionals
2300 Teachers with higher education
2310 College, university and higher education teaching professionals (including
prepodavateli in VUZ)
2320 Secondary education teaching professionals; teachers (uchitelia)
23 31 Primary education teaching professionals
2332 Pre-primary education teaching professionals
2340 Special education teaching professionals
2351 Education methods specialists
2352 School inspectors
2359 Other teaching professionals not elsewhere classified
2411 Accountants
2412 Personnel and careers professionals
2419 Business professionals not elsewhere classified
2421 Lawyers
2422 Judges
2429 Legal professionals not elsewhere classified
2431 Archivists and curators
2432 Librarians and related information professionals
2400 Art critics
2441 Economists
2442 Sociologists, anthropologists and related professionals
2443 Philosophers, historians and political scientists
2444 Philologists, translators and interpreters
2445 Psychologists
2446 Social work professionals
2451 Authors, journalist and other writers
2452 Sculptors, painters and related artists
2453 Composers, musicians and singers
2454 Choreographers and dancers
2455 Film, stage and related actors and directors
2460 Religious professionals
3111 Chemical, physical and science technicians
3112 Civil engineering technicians
3113 Electrical engineering technicians
3114 Electronics and telecommunications engineering technicians
3115 Mechanical engineering technicians
3116 Chemical engineering technicians
3117 Mining and metallurgic technicians
3118 Draughts persons
3119 Physical and engineering science technicians not elsewhere classified; engineers
without higher education, n.e.c; lab workers
3121 Computer assistants
3122 Computer equipment operators
3123 Industrial robot controllers
3131 Photographers and image and sound recording equipment operators
3132 Broadcasting and telecommunications equipment operators
3133 Medical equipment operators
3139 Optical and electronic equipment operators not elsewhere classified
3141 Ships' engineers
3142 Ships' deck officers and pilots
3143 Aircraft pilots and related associate professionals
3144 Air traffic controllers
3145 Air traffic safety technicians
3151 Building and fire inspectors
3152 Safety, health and quality inspectors
3211 Life science technicians
3212 Agronomy and forestry technicians
3213 Farming and forestry advisors
3 221 Medical assistants
3222 Sanitarians
3223 Dieticians and nutritionists
3224 Optometrists and opticians
3225 Dental assistants
3226 Physiotherapists and related associate professionals
3227 Veterinary assistants
3228 Pharmaceutical assistants
3229 Modern health associate professionals (except nursing) not elsewhere classified
(medik with secondary education)
3231 Nursing associate professionals; nurses without higher education, n.e.c.
3232 Midwifery associate professionals
3241 Traditional medicine practitioners
3242 Faith healers
3310 Teachers with less than higher education
3320 Pre-primary education teaching associate professionals
3330 Special education teaching associate professionals
3340 Other teaching associate professionals; vocational education masters
3411 Securities and finance dealers and brokers
3412 Insurance representatives
3413 Estate agents
3414 Travel consultants and organizers
3415 Technical and commercial sales representatives
3416 Buyers; purchasing agents
3417 Appraisers, valuers and auctioneers
3419 Finance and sales associate professionals not elsewhere classified
3421 Trade brokers
3422 Clearing and forwarding agents
3423 Employment agents and labor contractors
3429 Business services agents and trade brokers not elsewhere classified
3431 Administrative secretaries and related associate professionals
3432 Legal and related business associate professionals
3433 Bookkeepers
3434 Statistical, mathematical and related associate professionals
3439 Administrative associate professionals not elsewhere classified
3441 Customs and border inspectors
3442 Government tax and excise officials
3443 Government social benefits officials
3444 Government licensing officials
3449 Customs, tax and related government associate professionals n.e.c.
3450 Police inspectors and detectives
3460 Social work associate professionals
3471 Decorators and professional designers
3472 Radio, television and other announcers
3473 Street, night-club and related musicians, singers and dancers
3474 Clowns, magicians, acrobats and related associate professionals
3475 Athletes, sports persons and related associate professionals
3479 Artistic directors (khudruk); cultural-educational workers
3480 Religious associate professionals
4000 Sluzhashchie (non-manual workers, often implies specialized education)
4111 Stenographers and typists
4112 Word-processors and related operators
4113 Data entry operators
4114 Calculating machine operators
4115 Secretaries
4121 Accounting and bookkeeping clerks




4141 Library and filing clerks
4142 Mail carriers and sorting clerks
4143 Coding, proof-reading and related clerks
4144 Scribes and related workers
4190 Other office clerks
4211 Cashiers and ticket clerks
4212 Tellers and other counter clerks
4213 Bookmakers and croupiers
4214 Pawnbrokers and money-lenders
4215 Debt-collectors and related workers
4221 Travel agency and related clerks
4222 Receptionists and information clerks
4223 Telephone switchboard operators
5100 Servants
5111 Travel attendants and travel stewards
5112 Transport conductors
5113 Travel guides
5121 Housekeepers and related workers
5122 Cooks
5123 Waiters, waitresses and bartenders
5131 Child-care workers
5132 Institution-based personal care workers
5133 Home-based personal care workers
5139 Personal care and related workers not elsewhere classified
5141 Hairdressers, barbers, beauticians and related workers
5142 Companions and valets
5143 Undertakers and embalmers
5149 Other personal services workers not elsewhere classified
5151 Astrologers and related workers




5169 Protective services workers not elsewhere classified
5210 Fashion and other models
5220 Shop salespersons and demonstrators
5230 Stall and market salespersons
6111 Field crop and vegetable growers
6112 Tree and shrub crop growers
6113 Gardeners, horticultural and nursery growers
6114 Mixed-crop growers
6121 Dairy and livestock producers
6122 Poultry producers
6123 Apiarists and sericulturists
6124 Mixed-animal producers
6129 Market-oriented animal producers and related workers not elsewhere classified
6130 Market-oriented crop and animal producers
6141 Forestry workers and loggers
6142 Charcoal burners and related workers
6151 Aquatic-life cultivation workers
6152 Inland and coastal waters fishery workers
6153 Deep-sea fishery workers
6154 Hunters and trappers
6210 Subsistence agricultural and fishery workers
7000 Masters; brigadiers n.e.c. (not in agriculture)
7100 Construction workers n.e.c.
7111 Miners and quarry workers
7112 Shot firers and blasters
7113 Stone-splitters, cutters and carvers
7121 Builders, traditional materials
7122 Bricklayers and stonemasons
7123 Concrete placers, concrete finishers and related workers
7124 Carpenters and j oiners
7129 Building frame and related trades workers not elsewhere classified; prorab
(construction superintendents)
7131 Roofers




7136 Plumbers and pipe fitters
7137 Building and related electricians
7139 Germetchik and other workers in the final stages of construction
7141 Painters and related workers
7142 Varnishers and related painters
7143 Building structure cleaners
7211 Metal molders and coremakers
7212 Welders and flame cutters
7213 Sheet-metal workers
7214 Structural-metal preparers and erectors
7215 Riggers and cable-splicers
7216 Underwater workers
7221 Blacksmiths, hammer-smiths and forging-press workers
7222 Tool-makers and related workers
7223 Tokar (7213, lathe operator)
7224 Shlifovshchitsa (grinder/polisher)
7231 Mekhanik (mechanic)
7232 Aircraft engine mechanics and fitters
7233 Agricultural- or industrial-machinery mechanics and fitters
7241 Slesar (locksmith)
7242 Electronics fitters
7243 Electronics mechanics and servicers
7244 Telegraph and telephone installers and servicers
7245 Electrical line installers, repairer and cable jointers
7311 Precision-instrument makers and repairers
7312 Musical-instrument makers and tuners
7313 Jewelry and precious-metal workers
7321 Abrasive wheel formers, potters and related workers
7322 Glass-makers, cutters, grinders and finishers
7323 Glass engravers and etchers
7324 Glass, ceramics and related decorative painters
7331 Handicraft workers in wood and related materials
7332 Handicraft workers in textile, leather and related materials
7341 Compositors, typesetter and related workers
7342 Stereotypers and electrotypers
7343 Printing engravers and etchers
7344 Photographic and related workers
7345 Bookbinders and related workers
7346 Silk-screen, block and textile printers
7411 Butchers, fishmongers and related food preparers
7412 Bakers, pastry-cooks and confectionery makers
7413 Dairy-product makers
7414 Fruit, vegetable and related preservers
7415 Food and beverage tasters and graders
7416 Tobacco preparers and tobacco products makers
7421 Wood treaters; coopers (cask makers)
7422 Cabinet-makers and related workers
7423 Woodworking-machine setters and setter-operators
7424 Basketry weavers, brush makers and related workers
7431 Fibre-preparers
7432 Weavers, knitters and related workers
7433 Tailors, dressmakers and hatters
7434 Furriers and related workers
7435 Textile, leather and related pattern-makers and cutters
7436 Sewers, embroiderers and related workers
7437 Upholsterers and related workers
7441 Pelt dressers, tanners and fellmongers
7442 Shoe-makers and related workers
8000 Masters; brigadiers in plants and factories; skilled factory workers n.e.c.
8111 Mining-plant operators
8112 Mineral-ore- and stone-processing-plant operators
8113 Well drillers and borers and related workers
8121 Ore and metal furnace operators
8122 Metal melters, casters, and rolling-mill operators
8123 Metal-heat-treating-plant operators
8124 Metal drawers and extruders
8131 Glass and ceramics kiln and related machine operators
8139 Glass, ceramics and related plant operators not elsewhere classified
8141 Wood-processing-plant operators
8142 Paper-pulp-plant operators
8143 Papermaking plant operators
8151 Crushing-, grinding- and chemical-mixing-machinery operators
8152 Chemical-heat-treating-plant operators
8153 Chemical-filtering- and separating-equipment operators
8154 Chemical-still and reactor operators (except petroleum and natural gas)
8155 Petroleum- and natural-gas-refining-plant operators
8159 Chemical-processing-plant operators not elsewhere classified
8161 Power-production-plant operators
8162 Steam-engine and boiler operators
8163 Incinerator, water-treatment and related plant operators
8171 Automated-assembly-line operators
8172 Industrial-robot operators
8211 Machine-tool operators (rotary milling)
8212 Cement and other mineral products machine operators
8221 Pharmaceutical- and toiletry-products machine operators
8222 Ammunition- and explosive-products machine operators
8223 Metal finishing-, plating- and coating-machine operators
8224 Photographic-products machine operators
8229 Chemical-products machine operators not elsewhere classified
8231 Rubber-products machine operators
8232 Plastic-products machine operators
8240 Wood-products machine operators
8251 Printing-machine operators
8252 Bookbinding-machine operators
8253 Paper-products machine operators
8261 Fibre-preparing-, spinning- and winding-machine operators
8262 Weaving- and knitting-machine operators
8263 Sewing-machine operators
8264 Bleaching-, dyeing- and cleaning-machine operators
8265 Fur- and leather-preparing-machine operators
8266 Shoemaking- and related machine operators
8269 Textile-, fur- and leather-products machine operators not elsewhere classified
8271 Meat- and fish-processing-machine operators
8272 Dairy-products machine operators
8273 Grain- and spice-milling-machine operators
8274 Baked-goods, cereal and chocolate-products machine operators
8275 Fruit-, vegetable- and nut-processing-machine operators
8276 Sugar production machine operators
8277 Tea-, coffee- and cocoa-processing-machine operators
8278 Brewers', wine- and other beverage-machine operators




8284 Metal-, rubber- and plastic-products assemblers
8285 Wood and related products assemblers
8286 Paperboard, textile and related products assemblers
8290 Other machine operators and assemblers
8311 Locomotive-engine drivers
8312 Railway brakers, signalers and shunters
8320 Drivers not specified
8321 Motor-cycle drivers
8322 Car, taxi and van drivers
8323 Bus and tram drivers
8324 Heavy truck and lorry drivers
8331 Motorized farm and forestry plant operators
8332 Earth-moving- and related plant operators
8333 Crane, hoist and related plant operators
8334 Lifting-truck operators
8340 Ships' deck crews and related workers
9111 Street food vendors
9112 Street vendors, non-food products
9113 Door-to-door and telephone salespersons
9120 Shoe cleaning and other street services elementary occupations
9131 Domestic helpers and cleaners
9132 Helpers and cleaners in offices, hotels and other establishments
9133 Hand-launderers and pressers
9141 Building caretakers
9142 Vehicle, window and related cleaners
9151 Messengers, package and luggage porters and deliverers
9152 Doorkeepers, watchpersons and related workers
9153 Vending-machine money collectors, meter readers and related workers
9161 Garbage collectors
9162 Sweepers and related laborers
9211 Farm-hands and laborers; dekkhanin; kolkhoznik; krest'ianin; doyarka; teliatnitsa;
vinarka; pastukh; chaban; polevod; osemenitel
9212 Forestry laborers
9213 Fishery, hunting and trapping laborers
9311 Mining and quarrying laborers
9312 Construction and maintenance laborers: roads, dams and similar constructions
9313 Building construction laborers
9321 Assembling laborers
9322 Hand packers and other manufacturing laborers
9329 Unskilled workers, n.e.c.
9331 Hand or pedal vehicle drivers
9332 Drivers of animal-drawn vehicles and machinery
9333 Freight handlers
9999 Housewives; students; pupils; unemployed
0110 Armed forces
% owed wages
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Figure 1: Pjowed by Gender
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Figure 4.1: Pjowed by Education
Source: Table 4.1
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Figure 5.1: Pjowed by Region
Source: Table 5.1
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Figure 6.1: Pjowed by Occupation
Source: Table 6.1
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